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ABSTRACT 
Questions of laissez faire versus public regulation, 
and of free trade versus potection for domestic production 
and domestic techniques have been debated in Europe, followed 
by the rest of the world since at least the sixteenth century. 
Such choices, in real-life, seldom have been determined by 
abstract principles of economics, but have been based on an 
analysis of the different forces governing social and political 
behaviour, ana on judgments about whether the country or society 
would derive a greater advantage from more or less public regu-
lation, or from a greater or smaller degree of restriction 
placed on imports and exports. The pursuits of economic power 
and national affluence have gone hand in hand in such debates. 
Free trade doctrines have usually been favoured by countries 
enjoying dominance in the areas of international trade and 
finance. The doctrinal triumph of comparative advantage and 
free trade theories in mainstream economics, despite their poor 
record as explanatory hypotheses, has recently been challenged 
by new international trade theories that take increasing returns, 
technical progress and path-dependent development seriously. 
The socalled new political economy seeks to lay the blame for 
the poor performance of most less developed economies almost 
exclusively at the door of government interference in public 
life. In the process it misreads history and misses out on the 
complexity of analysis of society that was the hallmark of 
discussion regarding the relative roles of public regulation, 
free markets and protection in different areas of economic life 
in the days of Adam Smith predecessors and his immediate 
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followers. The policy prescriptions of new political economy 
sidetrack the inference derivable from new developmental trade 
theory and put the cart before the horse by seeking to make 
institutional change a mere handmaiden of mythic competitive 
markets rather than regarding markets as institutions that must 
be suitably supported by other institutions promoting economic 
growth and social equity. 
1, Mercantilism, free trade and. the old political economy 
Free trade and laissez faire doctrines have enjoyed a 
claim to universalis™ since their magisterial formulation in 
Adam Smith's Wealth of H^tion^. By contrast, the opponents 
of free trade have been dubbed as particularist, protectionist, 
obstructionist and pleaders of particular interest groups. 
Adam Smith invented a whole doctrine of mercantilism in order 
to corral all his imagined opponents into a convenient ravine 
and bury them under a hail of contumely and ridicule. The 
latter-day descendants of Adam Smith have seen in the opponents 
of free trade advocates of authoritarian states, self-defeating 
Keynesianisrn and comforters and abettors of rent-seekers. 
'Mercantilism1 has become a term of abuse in the writings of 
most economists. 
Since the days of Hecksche-r, mercantilism has been seen 
as a set of doctrines purporting to serve the pursuit of national 
economic power often at the cost of general economic welfare 
and plenty. They have also been seen to be quite ineffective 
even for the pursuit of economic power as the principal goal. 
By contrast, free trade has generally been seen as the proper 
policy regime for the promotion of economic welfare and plenty. 
One contention of this paper is that free trade, no less than 
mercantilism can be seen as the regime for the pursuit of 
national economic power provided the nation or economy enjoys 
certain advantages. Indeed, some of the most percipient advoca-
tes of free trade saw economic power as growing out of plenty 
or affluence. There are echoes of this line of thinking in a 
considerable body of contemporary international trade theory. 
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Another contention of this paper is that protectionist ins-
truments can in fact be effective tools of defence or pursuit 
of power but that their degree of effectiveness depends, as 
they depended in the days of mercantilism, on the wider policy 
framework and not just on instruments of foreign trade regula~ 
tion. 
Economists and historians have generally accepted Adam 
Smith's version of mercantilism as the gospel truth and have 
not given enough credit to the 'mercantilists1 for the effort 
they made to figure out the institutional changes needed for 
attaining high rates of economic growth and employment. Nor 
has it always been realized that in Europe during the sixteenth, 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the instruments of 
national protection rather than local protection of industries, 
techniques and innovations were being forged with varying 
degrees of success. Many publicists in the most successful 
economy of the late eighteenth century, viz., Britain had a 
shrewd idea that laissez faire was not only their best policy 
from a liberterian point of view but that free trade in external 
commerce could benefit the already wealth economies. In this 
first section, we will summarize some of the most important 
arguments advanced by the advocates of free trade and of 
continued protection or regulation for important sectors of the 
economy in the eighteenth century. We will concentrate entirely 
on the views of Adam Smith, Josiah Tucker, David Hume and two 
of their most important latter-day interpreters, viz. Jacob 
Viner and Eli Heckscher. This summary, I hope, will convince 
many of our contemporaries that these debates can better 
illuminate the terms of discourse in the choice of a trade 
regime in the modern world. 
Adam Smith's anathema against what he dubbed as the 
mercantile system (Smith, 1776, Book IV, chapters I-VIII) was 
reiterated and given a new force of moral opprobrium in the 
monumental Mercantilism of Eli Heckscher (1935, 1955). 
Heckscher constructed a system out of three centuries of 
debates on doctrines and policies in western and southern 
Europe including Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Spain and Italy. According to him, the statesmen of Europe 
between the sixteenth and the middle of the eighteenth centuries 
strove especially 'towards the unification of the territory of 
the state economically and the use of resources of their 
countries in the interests of the political power cf the state1 
(Heckscher, 1936, p.2o). Heckscher was himself a convinced 
free trader - he was after all the originator of the Heckscher -
Ohlin theory of comparative advantage - and regarded the 
mercantilists* pursuit of power to the neglect of plenty as 
fundamentally flawed from a moral point of view. But he was 
not wholly consistent in his excoriation of the ends of the 
mercantilist writers. For he conceded that the latter's 
conception of society was in 'fundamental accord with that of 
^laissez faire' (Heckscher, 1936, p.31). Yet he thought that 
'the humanitarian outlook.' was entirely alien to the pre-
Smithian writers - an outlook that he found explicated in the 
writings of 'Adam Smith, Malthus, Bentham, Romilly and 
Wilberforce' (Heckscher, 1936, p.33). 
Heckscher never made clear what he meant by society in 
this particular context : this failure to deal with society as 
an entity, incidentally, is shared by the majority of latter-
day free traders. The assignment of priority to power rather 
than plenty as the alleged end of mercantilist writers was 
criticised by Jacob Viner (1935) in his review of Heckscher 
(1935), and the criticism was spelled out by him in more 
detail later on (Viner, 1948). 
The systematization of mercantilist policies and theories 
into a body of doctrines in the hands of Adam Smith and his 
successors the admirers of mercantilism such as Roscher and 
Schmoller in Germany, Cunningham and to a lesser extent, Ashley 
and Lipson in Britain, and critics such as Heckscher and Viner 
among modern theorists and historians of economic thought - has 
been echoed in the work of Michel Foucault, who has discerned 
the play of power in the construction of all bodies of knowledge 
- especially those concerned with the human sciences (Foucault, 
1970, especially Part I, chapter 6; and Foucault, 1972). While 
Heckscher thought the pursuit of power to the detriment of human 
welfare was peculiarly characteristic of the aims of mercantilist 
writers, and free trade policies embodied a universalistic 
humanitarianism, Foucault has condemned political economy as 
yet another system for achieving and perpetuating the dominance 
of man over man. Pace Heckscher, all advocates of free trade 
were not equally indifferent to the possibility of attaining 
both plenty and dominance through their preferred polity. On 
the other side, advocates of specific mercantilist policies 
were at the same time proponents of laissez faire and republi-
canism. Hence it is wrong to see the triumph of free trade 
doctrines rs necessarily the triumph of the ideology of freedom, 
except in a narrow libertarian sense (as for example, Appleby, 
1978 and 1984 seems to have done). Many advocates of mercanti-
list and free trade policies may have had common goals but 
differed in respect of instruments because they perceived their 
circumstances to be different (Hont, 1990, Pocock, 1975, 1990 and 
Winch, 1985). 
Heckscher was a historian of economic theory but he was 
contemptuous of attempts to relate particular economic conditions 
to the ways in which contemporary advocates of particular poli-
cies systematised their thinking. As Coleman pointed out in his 
editor's introduction to Hevisi^ons^ in Mercantili^sm^ in Heckscher *s 
account, 'the common element in formulating policy is always 
assumed to be the common "system" of thought called mercantilism; 
what is specifically ruled out is that the policy may have been 
the outcome, even in part, of the existence of common elements 
in the economic situation, in the circumstances of economic life'. 
Moreover, 'the emphasis upon a "common European problem", in 
combination with the classical economists' approach, i.e. isola-
ting economic variables from others, means that inadequate 
regard is paid to the elements that are not common, in space or 
in time; variations by country or region, variations according 
to secular or short-term movements in the economic situation' 
(Coleman, 1969, pp. 9-10). 
In his chapters on the actual economic policies pursued 
under mercantilism, Heckscher clearly differentiated between 
different countries and the different packages of policies they 
followed, with different degrees of success (Heckscher, 1955, 
Vol.1, chapters II-VIl). At the risk of some degree of over-
simplification, it may be argued that the degree of success of 
the balance of payments or export trade objectives of the 
policymakers during the mercantilist age depended very largely 
on the extent to which internal markets had been truly unified 
on a national basis. The unification of the internal market in 
turn depended on the extent.to which the national state had 
triumphed, the economic and judicial privileges of feudal lords 
and corporate bodies such as guilds and municipalities had been 
curbed and internal transport and exchange mechanism had managed 
to connect all internal markets into a national network. Judged 
by such criteria, of the three western European countries speci-
fically taken up by Heckscher, viz., Germany, France and England, 
Germany performed very poorly in respect of political unification, 
abolition of privilages of feudal lords and corporate bodies and 
unification of exchange mechanisms including the currencies of 
the realms. France performed well in respect of political 
unification but poorly in respect of abolition of feudal and 
corporate privileges and a proper interleaving of the national 
exchange network. England did best by all the three criteria. 
This superiority was one major factor in her ability to outbid 
France and Germany in terms of development of machine-based 
large-scale industry by the end of the eighteenth century (see, 
especially Heckscher, 1955, vol.1, pp.164-203). The unsatis-
factory outcome of the promotion of inventions and luxury manu-
factures under royal or more generally state patronage in 
France which Mantoux (1961, pp. 23-33) had already commented 
upon in the beginning of this century was at least partly 
due to the weight of the other factors constraining industrial 
growth in that country as compared with England. It is 
possible to argue that the same cluster of advantages also 
enabled England to outdistance the Netherlands, her arch-rival 
in finance, transoceanic trade and shipping until the end of 
the seventeenth century, A study of the history of these four 
countries in the two centuries preceding Adam Smith's pronun-
ciation of anathema against the mercantile system would thus 
lead us to conclude that the success or failure of policies of 
protection of domestic industry (and agriculture) against 
foreign competition largely depended on the way the internal 
economy and society were being moulded to promote competition 
internally, even while it was to be sought to be restricted 
as far as -the entry of foreign commodities was concerned. 
Although Heckscher describes these variations when he comes 
to pass his judgement on the protectionist policies charac-
teristic of the age of mercantilism, he is curiously reticent 
about the differential advantages of mercantilist policies in 
different social and political settings. 
The same kind of insensitivity to local conditions, 
including local social variations, characterizes much of the 
advocacy of free trade in the modern world. Most often, the 
advocacy of state regulation, patronage or fostering is simply 
dismissed as ideologically motivated, or worse, as motivated 
by interests of sectional groups. In this again they are 
following Adam Smith1 : but unlike his latter-day followers, 
Adam Smith knew the economic dynamics of the country he was 
keenest to convert, viz., the United Kingdom. He had been 
preceded in some of his essential assumptions by David Hume, 
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and Josiah Tucker, and he was a better reader than his imme-
diate predecessor, Sir James Steuart, of the relative prospects 
of Scotsmen (and Englishmen) in a unified free-trading Britain 
compared with a protectionist, Colbertian kingdom of regulated 2 regionalism. 
A key element in the classical construction of the 
doctrine of free trade was David Hume's formulation of the 
socalled 'specie-flow price mechanism1, or the theory of the 
automatic adjustment of price levels to inflows and outflows 
of gold and silver (Hume, 1752). Hume held that it was irra-
tional fcr any country, including Great Britain, to prohibil 
or restrict the export of precious metals for fear that in the 
event of a lack of balance of trade between that country and 
the rest of the world, the precious me~als would leave it and 
render it poorer. The essence of Hume's mechanism is captured 
in the following passage (Hume, 1752, p.27) : 
Suppose four-fifths of all the money in Great 
Britain to be annihilated, and the nation reduced to 
the same condition, with regard to specie, as in the 
reigns of the Harrys and Edwards, v/hat would be the 
consequence ? Must not the price of all labour and 
commodities sink in proportion, and everything be 
sold as cheap as they were in those ages ? What 
nation could then dispute with us in any foreign 
market, or pretend to navigate or to sell manufactures 
at the same price, which to us would afford sufficient 
profit ? In how little time, therefore, must this 
bring back the money which we had lost, and raise us to 
the level of all the neighbouring nations ? Where, 
after we have arrived, we immediately lose the 
advantage of the cheapness of labour and commodities; 
and the farther flowing in of money is stopped by our 
fulness and repletion. 
Hume then supposed the contrary and showed that a 
sudden 'fulness* of specie would raise prices in such a 
fashion as to bring down the bullion rich country back to the 
level of its neighbours through an excess of imports over 
exports and a consequent outflow of specie in response to 
the lower prices prevalent in the nations with which the home 
country trades. This is the basic adjustment process which 
then became ensconced as an unchallenged orthodoxy until 
empirical testing of the specie-flow mechanism by J.W. Angell, 
Jacob Viner and J.H. Williams, and the implications of the 
Keynesian revolution brought the apparent simplicity, automa-
3 ticity and effectivity of the mechanism into question. 
Underlying Hume's formulation, there was a basic 
assumption that the trading country concerned, through all 
the upheavels of the adjustment process, should retain its 
'people and industry' (Hume, 1752, p,26) . Hume did not 
believe that the activity of people or industry was constant 
for all time. For, he also advocated banking and paper credit 
as instruments for economizing on specie and encouraging 
economic activity. Indeed, without the latter, mere expansion 
of paper credit might lead to trouble. Differing views 
regarding the impact of expansion of paper credit on prices 
and output could indeed be said to lie at the heart of the 
debate between the supporters and opponents of the English 
Bullion Report of 1810 (Viner, 1937, chapters III and IV). 
While Hume regarded the fear of loss of specie 
through free trade to be unfounded, he did believe that a rich 
country could ultimately become impoverished through the 
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permanent loss of a part of its stock of precious metals to 
a poorer country. The wages of the latter would, through the 
mechanism of trade, corne up to the level of the rich country, 
so that eventually the rich and the poor countries might meet 
somewhere in the middle, with the rich being less rich and 
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the poor being less poor. This part of his analysis was 
subjected to a strong critique by Josiah Tucker, the Dean of 
Gloucester. Tucker distinguished carefully between the 
effects of a sudden acquisition of wealth in the shape of 
mines and those of acquisition of riches 'in the way of 
general industry' (Tucker, 1774, p .2Q, as quoted in Semmel, 
1970, p.16). 
Tucker seems to have anticipated virtually all the 
later arguments suggesting that a rich country, with a high 
level of labour productivity, a long history of learning by 
doing in manufactures, a large endowment of skills, capital 
and knowledge, a highly developed infrastructure, and a large 
home market, will have a dynamic advantage in relation to a 
poor country which ranks low in respect of all the attributes 
described above. Tucker seems to have even recognized that 
the rich country would be better able than the poorer ones to 
undertake projects with long gestation periods, and to make 
experiments - that in effect, it would have a high rate of 
endogenous technical progress (Semmel, 1970, p.16)* He seems 
also to have appreciated the dual function of capital in a 
dynamic economy, viz., its role as a fund for setting 
capital projects into motion and its function as equipment 
and working environment fostering productivity growth through 
learning by doing, and introduction of innovations. A rich 
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country would have an advantage in productive investment 
because of the high rate of capital formation and it would 
have an advantage in productivity raising improvement, 
because of its superior endowment of skills, more intense 
division of labour and higher endowment of appropriate capital 
equipment. 
Tucker, therefore, thought that it was incorrect to 
expect the rich country to lose out to the poor in the 
process of trade, because of lower wages prevailing in the 
latter. In fact, he formulated a law which can be said to 
have anticipated much of the nineteenth century theory of 
international division of labour and which can be used to 
set the stage for the elaboration of the Prebisch - Singer -
Lewis - Emmanuel theories of unequal exchange and deteriorating 
terms of trade as between rich manufacturing nations and poor 
primary producers. The law ran thus : 'That cjderose, or 
complicated Manufactures are cheaper in rich countries : -
and raw Materials in poor ones : And therefore in Proportion 
as any commodity approaches to one, or other of these Extremes, 
in that proportion it will be found to be cheaper, or dearer 
in a rich, or a poor country' (Tucker, 1774, p.28, as quoted 
in Semmel, 1970, p.16). Timber, for example, would be cheaper 
in a poor country, but cabinet-work in the richer nation. 
Tucker did not believe that poor countries were pre-
destined to do badly in the long run. Two different kinds 
of hope were held out to them. The first was that the richer 
country would lend its capital and technical assistance to the 
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poorer country and thus raise its productivity (Semmel, 1970, 
p.16). Secondly, the poor country could adopt protectionist 
measures and try to develop skills and knowledge so as to 
come up to the level of the rich countries. The poorer 
country would also utilize its specific endowments of climate, 
soil and the natural turn and peculiar genius of its people 
to try and forge ahead in the arts of manufacture (Semmel, 
1970, pp. 17-18). 
Some of Tucker's arguments were developed later on by 
Adam Smith, Allyn Young, and Nicholas Kaldor. The arguments 
about economies of scale, learning by doing, and differential 
rates of endogenous technical progress have been used in 
recent times to produce models of trade under which some 
nations with particular advantages would dominate interna-
tional trade, and there was little the other countries could 
do except to adapt passively to the state of dynamic comparative 
advantage created by these dominant nations. 
Tucker brings us closer to one strand of thinking 
about economic policy-making and its relation to tie choice 
of an appropriate trade regime that has been strangely 
neglected in mainstream economics. This is the concern about 
effecting profitable technical change in all branches of 
economic activity but especially in manufacturing. Capitalist 
societies evolved various devices for encouraging the making 
of inventions or the import of useful inventions. The first 
patent law is credited to the Venetian Senate which in 1474 
provided for the registration of inventions and their protection 
for ten years (Lane, 1973, p.320 and McLeod, 1938, p.11). This 
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procedure was imitated, with many variations, by other 
European states. The early beneficiaries of the system 
were often Italian immigrant craftsmen, since they tended 
to be the most advanced in the dynamic fields of 'manufacture 
or craft-work. In England a patent was granted for glass-
making in 1552, 'apparently to an Englishman, Smyth, the 
next in 1561 to two immigrants for making Castile soap' 
(McLeod, 1988, p.11). 'Acquisition of superior Continental 
technology was the predominant motive for the issue of 
patents under the guidance of Elizabeth I's chief minister, 
William Cecil, later Lord Burghley. The shaping of patents 
to serve his policy of importing and improving technology 
left a lasting imprint ' (McLeod, 1988, p.l). 
Thus protection of infant technologies w?s often as 
pressing a concern of the policy-makers in the Europe of the 
sixteenth to eighteenth centuries as the protection of parti-
cular trades. The Statute of Monopolies passed by the British 
Parliament in 1624 specifically exempted inventions from the 
prohibition against the granting of monopolies through letters 
patent by the Crown. This does not mean that the introduction 
of new inventions - especially those that threatened to disrupt 
an existing craft and cause unemployment - was unproblematic 
during this period. Especially under the Stuarts, the Crown 
tried to outlaw the introduction of several such inventions. 
But by and large, most profitable inventions were eventually 
introduced and managed to enjoy protection from the state 
(Clark, 1936). In England, the power of guilds had already 
broken down by the beginning of the eighteenth century, 
especially in new areas of growth such as the countryside 
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around Manchester and Liverpool (Wadsworth and Mann,/1955, 
chapter VI), and the acceleration of economic and demographic 
growth from the late seventeenth century produced an atmosphere 
of creative innovation and destruction, especially in many 
relatively new industries such as cotton-spinning and iron work. 
If we examine Adam Smith's work in the light of our 
knowledge of how economic policy-making was shaped in the 
tradition which was the particular target of his attack, we 
notice how cleverly he lumped together different kinds of 
pressures for regulation or restriction under the generic 
name of 'monopolies'. He also had the foresight to realize 
that, although in his view, free trade policies would benefit 
manufactures and traders immensely, traders or manufacturers 
were themselves the enemies of those policies. So he appealed 
over their heads to others who mattered and he appealed 
perhaps to the long-term pursuit of self-interest by manufac-
turers and traders as a class. His sense of political economy 
was doubly apt; he not only perceived the basic division of 
the society of his time into landlords, capitalists and wage-
earners, he also knew that effective political power lav with 
the landlords. Did he not also argue that in respect of public 
attention and government patronage agriculture in Europe suffered 
in comparison with the other sectors of the economy ? 
In spite of Adam Smith's persuasiveness, lai_ss_e2 fjirj, 
policies did not triumph in the arena of British external trade 
until more than sixty years after the publication of the WeaJ.th 
of Nations. (Adam Smith had not in any case expected free 
trade principles to triumph in England for many, many years). 
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Looking back, we could attribute this to the interruption of 
the policies embodied in the Anglo-French (Eden) treaty of 
1786 by the wars of the French Revolution and the Nepoleonic 
Wars, to the strength of the particularistic interests, or to 
the new interest of landlords in protectionism kindled by the 
influx of grain supplies from countries blessed with lower 
wages or more abundant land. But the evidence could also be 
read as a demonstration that la_j_ss_ez faire policies in .inter-
national trade are adopted by a country voluntarily only when 
it has achieved assured dominance in areas of critical impor-
tance. In the case of Britain, international economic dominance 
comprised not only unquestioned leadership in the new machine-
based manufactures, but in shipping and ship-building and in a 
newly invigorated international capital market. 
The contemporary history and the sense of political 
setting that render Adam Smith's maanum p£us so compulsively 
readable even today virtually disappeared from the work of the 
classical economists and of their successors in orthodoxy, viz., 
the neoclassical economists. But that did not prevent the 
static comparative cost theory constructed by David Ricarao 
from claiming the foreground in all later theories of inter-
national trade. The specie-flow-price mechanism, comparative 
cost theory and the theory of reciprocal demand of John Stuart 
Mill were all challenged by J.H. Williams, Frank Graham, Mihail 
Manoilesco and a host of post-Kevanesian theorists who found 
the assumptions of full employment and full utilization of 
resources underlying the work of Ricardo, Mill and Marshall 
(though not of Adam Smith, or of course, Karl Marx) too glaring 
in inconsistency with the real world to be absorbed into their 
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conceptual framework. Theories of imperfect and monopolistic 
competition remained for long foreign bodies which could not 
be absorbed into a general equilibrium framework. Since the 
mainstream theories of international trade remained wedded 
to the latter, trade theorists went on merrily waltzing in 
a world of perfect certainty and perfectly competitive markets 
fully furnished with the necessary complements of trading in 
future in all goods and services. The very difficulty of 
incorporating real world phenomena assured the victory of 
theory over reality. 
Attempts were made to produce sophisticated versions 
of Heckscher-Ohlin theory and to dynamize the Ricardian theory 
by taking circulating capital and intermediate inputs into 
account, ana then test these against trade patterns in the real 
world. By ar.d large, however, even sophisticated tests such 
as those performed by Learner (1984) lacked historical depth. 
In most cases, the theories performed better in explaining 
trade flows between the poor, primary product-exporting 
developing ccuntries and the affluent, manufacturing nations 
than those between developed market economies. Moreover, the 
dynamic factor$ such as investment rates or patterns and 
speeds of technical change are largely treated as exogenous 
actors in these extensions. Thus, the task of linking trade 
and growth by developing traditional Ricardian or Heckscher-
Ohlin theories has been imperfectly accomplished even by the 
best practitioners (for a competent and interesting summary 
of these developments, see Evans, 1988, chapters 6 and 9). 
In the meantime, as pointed out earlier, other theorists 
were trying to incorporate dynamic returns to scale and techni-
cal change in new theories of growth (Kaldor, 1957, Arrow 1962; 
and Kaldor and Mirrlees, 1962), conceptualize 'local' techni-
cal change and the fruitfulness of localized. R & D (Atkinson 
and Stglitz, 1969) and absorb monopolistic competition into 
the mainstream theory of international trade (Dixit and Norman, 
1980). On the other side, evidence accumulated of the formi-
dable emergence of Japan as a new industrial giant to reckon 
with and the effective use by that country of a wide array of 
measures of governmental guidance, regulation and support. A 
little later, evidence mounted of the success of intervention 
by government in the economic life of South Kcrea and the 
Taiwan Province of China, two medium-sized economies which 
outperformed most other runners in the league of the socalled 
newly industrializing countries.^ Evidence also accumulated 
of how, while the mainstream theorists based in the U.S.A., 
Britain and other European countries advocated free trade, the 
governments of those countries continued to pursue protectionist 
and in some cases, etaiist policies with a view to arresting 
the decline of sunset industries and for fostering sunrise 
industries. Despite this kind of evidence, 'vulgar' neo-
classical economics decked oi.it with some dubious sociology and 
even more dubious history and calling itself 'new political 
economy', launched a new assault on all public attempts to 
imorove the conditions of living of ordinary people in developed 
7 as well as underdeveloped countries. 
In the next section I will refer to some results of the 
new theory of international trade and consider their implication 
for the possibility of public intervention in trace and inausty. 
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In the final section I will critically examine some proposi-
tions advanced by leading protagonists of the new political 
economy, and look at the real reasons for the current triumph 
of the new political economy in the underdeveloped world. 
2, The new theories of international trade and the possibility 
of public intervention 
The work done in recent years by a host of economists 
led by Avinash Dixit, Paul Krugman, Wilfred Ethier, Elhanan 
Helpman, James Brander and Barbara Spencer in the area of 
international trade and investment, by B.C. Eaton and R.G. 
Lipsey in the field of product differentiation and by Robert o 
Lucas and Paul Romer° in the area of economic growth has its 
antecedents in the theories and descriptions proposed by 
Frank Graham (1923), Allyn Young (1928), Nicholas Kaldor 
(1957 and 1972), S.B. Linder (1962), Michael Posner (1961), 
Kenneth Arrow (1962) and Raymond Vernon (1966). What the new 
group of theorists have done is to make increasing returns, 
technical progress, learning by doing, external economies and 
monopolistic and strategic behaviour integral elements of 
their theories rather than introduce them mainly as critiques 
of the neoclassical orthodoxy. The same elements have also 
been systematized to provide the basis of a different genre 
of stories of economic growth. Recent work of core-periphery 
relations, or the agglomeration effects of increasing returns 
and external economies harp back to themes introduced earlier 
by Francois Perroux, Gunnar Myrdal, Paul Baran, Raul Pre'oisch, 
Hans Singer, Cswaldo Sunkel, Celso Furtado, Andre Gunder 
Frank, Samir Amin, Imrnanuel Wallerstein and other writers, 
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many of whom are aligned with the dependency, world-system 
9 or Marxian schools. 
The recent theories of trade and growth adopt different 
sets of assumptions for setting out the basic framework, and 
arrive at different specific conclusions. But all of them 
depart from the usual neoclassical assumptions of constant 
returns, pure competition and perfect information. In their 
different versions they lay special stress on the importance 
of initial conditions and first-mover advantages, increasing 
returns, technical progress brought about by deliberate R & D 
expenditure, learning by doing or learning by using, and the 
possibiJ.ity of strategic manipulation, preemptive action, and 
make room for the use of various types of public intervention 
in order to achieve dominance in international trade or 
counter strategic behaviour by firms and governments of other 
countries, 
I will not here try to summarize the results of even 
the most prominent of these theories. Instead I will try to 
.indicate the flavour of their reasoning, and cite a few real 
life situations for which neoclassical theory had no explana-
tion but which are well explained by particular variants of 
these new theories. I will also then try to indicate that 
the attempt to restore confidence in free trade and minimal 
government, especially for a country which does not enjoy 
dominance in any sector of international trade, has nothing 
but an irrefragable ideological bias to recommend it. 
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Let us supoose that there is an industry which is 
characterized by economies of scale that are not exhausted 
with the size of a particular economy (say, Country A). It 
is also assumed that there are other firms in the world 
economy which are already exploiting the economies of scale 
fully. If the government does not offer some protection 
against external competition, then no investment will occur 
in that industry in that country. For, at the prevailing 
world prices, taking into account the risk of the investment 
not being as profitable ex post as it appeared ex ,ante, the 
potential investor's expected rate of return will be less 
than the prevailing rate of return in the country (for in 
the fully riskless situation, the investor can just about 
recover costs including the cost of capital). The government 
may decide to offer protection or a subsidy to a potential 
investor : the latter may then be required to start exporting 
abroad as a test of the efficiency of investment. Of course, 
with growth of the internal market, the investing firm may 
find it possible tc sell a large fraction of its output at 
home. In this sequence it is difficult to separate out inward 
- and out ward - directed strategies. But what comes out is 
a case for public intervention in support of domestic investment 
(cf. Graham, 1923 an-' Ethier, 1932). 
The case for protection against external competition 
need not be dependent only on the existence of static economies 
of scale. One situation in which the government may offer 
tariff protection is when there is a potential for development 
of a particular industry so that it would eventually be 
internationally competitive byt,which is not being developed 
because foreign competition - often of a predatory and pre-
emptive nature - prevails in the domestic market. An import 
tariff or quota restriction may then induce investors to 
invest in the industry : the investment response may be so 
vigorous that the capacity of the industry soon exceeds the 
size of the domestic market and the price of the commodity 
comes down to international levels or coes down even further. 
Such a policy may be especially justified when investment is 
expected to come out of potential saving of the upper classes 
and instead of crowding out other, more socially profitable 
investment, pushes up effective demand and reduces unemploymen 
The raising of the import tariff on sugar by the Indian 
government had such an effect in the 1930s (Bag.chi, 1963, 
chapter 2; and Bagchi, 1972, chapters 1 and 12), although 
that was hardly the intention behind the step taken. 
In yet other situations only some kind of public 
support or cooperative action can stimulate the development 
of an industry and allow even a country trying to install the 
particular technology for the first time to reap the full 
benefits of the transfer. The industrial advances made by 
Japan since the second World War are dotted with examples 
where she managed to imitate and then improve the technology. 
This goes for the Linz-Donawitz process for the making of 
steel (Lynn, 1984), and for the use of the semiconductor for 
the making of radio sets and other electronic equipment 
(Morita, Reingold and Shimomura, 1986) - successes which 
allowed Japan to assume leadership in those sectors from the 
1960s. There is an assumption in most of the conventional 
theory of international technology transfer thvt when an 
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economically more backward or lower-wage country imports 
sophisticated technology from an advanced economy it has to 
follow the specification prevailing in the latter. Again 
there are numerous examples to the contrary. A case .in 
point is that of the adaptation of a component of a Cummins 
diesel engine by Tsuzuki, a small Japanese firm. The latter 
succeeded in producing it in small quantities but with a 
quality that was comparable with that of the products of 
the US firm. 'The task was accomplished by substituting 22 
labour intensive processing stages for an automated transfer 
line' (Odaka, Ono and Adachi, 1938, p.13). 
The Japanese victory in the race for parity with the 
U.S.A. in semi-conductor technology has been unambiguously 
ascribed to public regulation and support (Borrus, Tyson and 
Zysman, 1986; Sigurd.son, 1983 and Okimcto, Sugano and Weinstein 
1984). Japanese success in importing technology and improving 
it and then beating the original developers in international 
competition has been replicated by other Hast Asian countries. 
As late as 1984, two major books on the semiconductor industry, 
one concerned with the general contours of development of the 
technology (Dosi, 1984) and the other devoted to the nature of 
competition between the U.S.A. and Japan (Okimoto, Sugano and 
Weinstein, 1984), the two global leaders of the industry, did 
not even mention South Korea and Taiwan. By 1987, both these 
regions were emerging as challengers of the two global leaders 
(Saghafi and Davidson, 1989). Unlike in the cases of mere 
assemblers of semiconductors such as Malaysia, Philippines 
and Mexico, South Korea, followed by Taiwan, had started full-
time production of semiconductor chips, which were competitive 
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in the international market. The strategies followed by 
South Korea and Taiwan were different, the former depending 
on conglomerates for commercializing production, the latter 
developing a joint-venture company, with the government as 
the chief shareholder for producing semiconductor chips and 
supplying private sector companies. But the success of both 
these regions has again shown how quickly patterns of compa~ 
rative advantage even in trade in sophisticated manufactures 
can change. 
Even though the government of South Korea and Taiwan 
have pursued very similar strategies with respect to the 
import of foreign technology, the development of indigenous 
capability, and the simultaneous or phased exploitation of 
domestic and export markets, there are also some major differ-
ences with regard to the structure of control of private 
industry. On the whole, Taiwan's industrial plants have been 
more regionally dispersed than those of South Korea (Amsden, 
J-991) . Moreover, the South Korean government has actively 
aided the growth of huge conglomerates (the chaebol)s whereas 
Taiwan has relied far more on medium and small-sized firms. 
These differences have also been reflected in the different 
patterns of development of the electronics industry in the 
two regions (Mody, 1990). The cases of Japan, South Korea 
and Taiwan illstrate the proposition that in suitable socio-
economic settings and appropriate government and business 
strategies, even latecomers can make rapid advances in tech-
nology absorption and quickly overtake some of their erstwhile 
mentors. 
On the other side, the general impression often conveyed 
in many parables of the growth of modern industry and interna-
tional trade that the pioneers of the industrial revolution in 
western Europe were model playgrounds of competitive games and 
development or absorption of technologies is also highly msilea-
ding. For example, Britain had highly imperfect capital and 
labour markets throughout the late eighteenth and most of the 
nineteenth century (Kennedy, 1987; Williamson, 1989). The 
upper classes of Britain also indulged extensively in 'rent-
seeking behaviour' much derided in recent literature, besides, 
of course, deriving a vast amount of rent from land during the 
whole period of her transition to an industrialized econcpmy 
(Rubinstein, 1933). To cap it all, all through the great age 
of technical invention, British businessmen made heavy weather 
of absorbing the silk-spinning aind silk-weaving technologies 
originally imported from Italy (Jones, 1907). 
The decline of British manufacturing prowess in relation 
to that of the U.S.A. and Germany has been attributed to cultural 
factors, to the reinforcement of gentlemanly values through 
public school education, and to rational adjustment of an economy 
whose dynamic comparative advantage lay in banking, finance and 
services, rather than in industry. However, the survival of 
Britain's dominance in some of the staples such as textiles, 
steel or shipbuilding has also been ascribed to the adaptation 
of Britain's skill endowments in a path-dependent, idiosyncratic 
pattern of evolution.10 
Economists for a long time sought their analogies in 
classical mechanics and modelled, their notions of equilibrium 
on those of the physicists. In this world, markets performed 
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perfectly, and wonIrously rational individuals, who have been 
aptly characterized by Sen (1977) as 'rational fools'; adapted 
instantaneously to any change in the state of the world. The 
introduction of notions of 'bounded rationality' (Simon, 1982) 
of behaviour in the presence of risk and uncertainty (Diamond 
and Rothschild, 1978), or of strategic behaviour has not made 
a major dent in the mainstream economists' vision of an economy 
consisting of neurotically rational individuals operating in a 
social void. If we have to properly absorb the facts of human 
experience as captured in economic decisions and outcomes and 
draw lessons for behaviour aimed at creating better societies, 
we should perhaps turn to the philosophy of natural history 
rather than of classical mechanics for a guide to modes of 
reasoning. Students of evolution have found that nature has 
thrown up many different types of organisms which are wonderfully 
adapted to their different environments. They have also found 
that similar organisms starting with apparently similar environ-
ments, have ended up with very different types of adaptation; 
and variations in some conditions during the course of evolution 
have led to very different outcomes in terms of genetic organi-
zation of individuals and their behaviour in a group (for seme 
fascinating examples, see Gould, 1977 and 1984). For example, 
haplodiploid organisms (those in which one of the two genders, 
generally the male, has an endowment of chromosomes only from 
one parent but the other gender has chromosomal endowments from 
both the parents) are much more likely to evolve tightly 
organized societies (such as those of bees or termites) than 
diploids (namely, those organisms in which members of either 
gender start with contributions from both the parents - as in 
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the case of all mammals, including human beings). But there 
are diploids who live in tightly-knit societies and there are 
haplodiploids who fail to evolve such societies. The varieties 
in the patterns of organization of human groups such as nations, 
nationalities or multinational states far more resemble the 
diversity found in nature than the uniformity beloved of mains-
tream trade theorists. 
Of course, analogical reasoning is not a safe guide : we 
must know how to discard it and when. Organisms in nature 
evolved through many millenia : their adaptation, selection and 
survival was achieved through the blind working of myriads of 
natural forces. In cases of human organizations, we do have 
conscious agencies at work. Where our perspective differs from 
the conventional trade theorists1 is in treating the market as 
just another man-made organization and the construction of the 
market and adaptation of human institutions as conscious acts 
of states, firms and particular social classes in partial or 
complete control of the state apparatus. The experience of the 
development of industrial capitalism can teach us something 
about how to go about designing institutions and policies. 
One basic set of strategies that distinguishes industrial 
capitalism from situations in which commerce is conducted under 
the dominance of feudal or other precapitalist relations is that 
human beings are treated as the major source of profit and power. 
The first sign of a new awareness of labour as the source of 
riches and power was the concern displayed by many mercantilist 
writers for fully employing the national work force but at low 
wages and under the firm control of masters. It has been argued 
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that the doctrines propagated by mercantilist writers, stressing 
exports and positive balances of trade, make sepse if they are 
interpreted as supporting a strategy for, 'using foreign trade 
as a device to keep the domestic economy stimulated, and for 
attaining full employment as the major operational end* (Allen, 
1987, pp. 447-8) . This interpretation harks back to Keynes' view 
that a favourable balance of trade, sought so eagerly by the 
mercantilist writers, would directly stimulate domestic demand 
and foreign investment, and indirectly encourage domestic invest-
ment by bringing down the rate of interest through an influx of 
precious metals (Keynes, 1936, pp.335-6). Keynes' view was 
strenuously contested by Heckscher in the second edition of his 
book (Hecksc'nei, 1955, vol.2, pp.340-358) . But his critique was 
based as much on his dislike, if not a serious misunderstanding 
of Keynes' own theory, as on the oversimplification practised by 
Keynes when he tried to distill the essence of mercantilism. 
For example, Hecksoher (1955, vol.2, p,341) thought that the 
central concepts oi Keynes' theory such as 'the propensity to 
consume, to hoard or to save1", 'liquidity preference- or 'the 
inducement to inve t' could not be verified by 'means of studies 
of the world about us'. Thus we have to attain a new understan-
ding of mercantilist doctrines and policies despite the adverse 
judgement passed on them by the great historian of mercantilism, 
as we have to recover the understanding <6f social processes 
and social philosophy that underpinned Adam Smith's advocacy of 
free trade, despite the de-historicized and de-institutionalized 
political economy professed by many of his followers. By Smith's 
time, educating the people had come to be regarded as one of 
the major responsibilities of publi: authorities. But even 
— . . — 
before the eighteenth century, Poor Laws had taken the place 
of medieval charity as the means of preventing starvation 
deaths of the disabled or displaced labourer or the artisan. 
Conscious investment in the upkeep of human beings in 
the shape, first, of Poor Laws and then of social insurance 
has characterized the growth of industrial capitalism in 
England, France and Germany, Reproducing a reserve army of 
labour in order to keep the latter in line has ever been part 
of the modus operandi of capitalism. However, that reserve 
army has not been treated as an unlimited reservoir to be 
exhausted at will : control of labour has required its delimi-
tation. Furthermore, capitalists realized the value of a 
better-educated labour force. Universalizing education has 
again been an objective pursued by all successful capitalist 
states. Under conditions of imperfect information about the 
quality of products and services, the working of market forces 
tends often to throw on the market only low-quality products 
and services (Akerlof, 1970). Universalizing education and 
getting the labour market segmented along lines of education 
and skill are ways of checking such tendencies of the market. 
Such strategies are pursued not because capitalists are philan-
thropists but because they have to competo in markets where 
quality sells. 
Along with such universalist strategies of successful 
industrial capitalism,others grow up which are more particu-
laristic in nature. Different societies evolve different 
strategies for attaining the aim of perfecting the social 
division of labour so as to gain and retain a competitive edge. 
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In some cases, private enterprises and associations of private 
firms are the main instruments for achieving the best social 
division of labour. The cotton textile industry of England 
in the nineteenth century seems to have fitted this pattern. 
In other countries and other industries, such as the metallur-
gical and power equipment industries of Germany and the U.S.A., 
the growth of large-scale firms with the internaticnalization of 
most production operations seems to have provided the best scope 
for a profitable social division of labour. In several French 
industrial cities in the nineteenth century, municipal or other 
local public bodies provided the framework for quality control, 
training of labour and. upgradation of technologies (Piore and 
Sabel, 1984; Sabel and Zeitlin, 1985). In Japan, a group of 
conglomerate firms using large numbers of subcontractors became 
the focus of social division of labour. But subcontracting is 
not a peculiarly Japanese phenomenon. It can grow up in other 
contexts, such as the Lyons conurbation in France in recent 
times, where firms in various branches of engineering have 
resorted to subcontracting on a large scale (Lorenz, 1988). 
The French system of municipal fostering, regional regulation, 
and local subcontracting networks is substained by a state 
apparatus which has been consciously interventionist in spite 
of cyclical Variations from time to time : the regimes of 
regulation have changed in respone to international and techno-
logical challenges, but the philosophy of state intervention 
has not. It is not obvious that the average Frenchman has 
done worse than the average Englishman because of this inter-
ventionist tendency of the state."1"1 
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The point I would like to drive at is that in designing 
appropriate trade policies and strategies of international 
competition, governments, firms and technological research 
laboratories must co-operate so as to evolve operating prin-
ciples suitable to each national setting. In socialist China, 
a publicly guided system of cooperation between local Govern-
ments, state and collective enterprises, universities or 
colleges and research laboratories was the chosen instrument 
of development, transfer, and absorption of technology. In 
South Korea, private firms contracting out research needs to 
state-controlled laboratories and collaborating with them for 
adapting imported technology to local needs became highly 
efficient instruments for upgradation and absorption of tech-
nology (Bagchi, 1987a, chapters 3 and 9; D'Costa, 1989). 
India, by contrast, has failed, on a national scale, 
to evolve a durable system of subcontracting or technology 
transfer, India's international competitiveness has suffered 
because of inefficient absorption and diffusion of both .imported 
and indigenous technology. In a world which is characterized 
by monopoly or oligopoly, surrender to international capital 
could be the worst way of choosing a strategy for improving 
the internal productivity and international competitiveness 
of largescale industry. As it is, it is the small and medium-
scale firms which provide the major part of Indian exports. 
Any reorientation of economic policies and political strategies 
must take that fact into account, as it must take account of 
the employment-generating of small firms. Simple-minded cures 
for the sluggishness of investment in the shape of mere loos-
ening of investment licensing regulations have not worked so 
far in India, as the stagnation of rates of investment as a 
proportion of GNP during the last ten years or more testifies. 
3. Free trade policies as strategies of dominance and the 
fragility of the new political economy 
It was long known that in most industries and in most 
countries of the world, firms using best-practice techniques 
co-existed with firms using very different techniques, and 
that the diffusion of new technologies displayed the same 
pattern of building in of apparent inefficiencies from the 
very beginning (Salter, 1959; Nabseth and Ray, 1974). The 
massive investment of the American steel industry in open-
hearth furnaces for steel-making long after the invention of 
the LD process is a very clear example. It was also known that 
transaction costs vary from economy to economy, from sector to 
sector, and that those costs have as much to do with the type 
and strength of informal networks of trade and credit as with 
formal laws and regulations, or with measurable differences in 
the advantages conferred by transport and communicalion systems. 
But trade theorists paid scant attention to these complexities. 
As we have noted above, the new theorists of trade and growth 
have taken increasing returns, learning by doing and endogenous 
technical progress as the basic ingrideints for their model-
building. But there is a tendency on the part of some of them 
to project indefinitely the dominance of today's large economies 
on the basis of their superiority in economies of scale, and 
R & D set-ups; there is also an anxious insistence that results 
of models of strategic behaviour should not be taken too 
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seriously for they depend critically on the values of certain 
parameters. Two of the leading theorists in the new mode of 
reasoning have warned that a bias for free trade may still be 
defended because the results of the new trade models are not 
robust enough (Krugman 1987b; Helpman, 1989). Others have been 
even more peremptory in their demand that a new philosophy of 
state intervention should not be built on the insecure founda-
tions of the new trade theories (Srinivasan, 1989). 
However, neither history nor theory tells us that free 
trade policies are more robust than policies of public regula-
tion in the sense that they can by themselves promote growth 
in the long run. Both sets of policies, in order to be success-
ful, require particular types of institutional changes, including 
changes in basic production relations in factories, farms, and 
cottage industries. Theories justifying intervention on a broad 
front have at least this to be said for them that they can 
incorporate blueprints for social change in their basic design 
and they do not have to appeal to ad hoc^ humanitarian criteria 
in order to justify such policies. This does not mean that all 
policies of protection of particular vested interests can or 
should be justified by appealing to some 'system1, any more than 
particularistic policies could be justified or vilified in the 
Europe of the ancjen regime by appealing to a posteriorly 
constructed mercantile model. 
Successful poli cies for promoting economic growth in 
the modern world will require several major foundations, viz., 
widespread, and ultimately universal, literacy, abolition of 
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landlordism, guarantee of a minimum subsistance for every 
inhabitant, and a class or a government endowed with a strong 
propensity to invest in the home territory (for elaboration 
of this theme in the Indian context, see Bagchi, 1991). The 
second and third conditions are beeded, inter alia, for directing 
the incentives of the rich away from speculative activities and 
towards longer-term investment, for curbing the dominion of 
non-market power and for mobilizing potential savings for 
purposes of investment. Literacy is needed for facilitating 
the flow of information and diffusion of new, productive techno-
logies. Finally, a high rate of investment is needed for 
speeding up growth with existing technologies and for promoting 
the spread of new technologies at the cost of old technologies 
and capital equipment of older vintages. 
John Maynard Keynes, who regarded himself as a liberal, 
and can hardly be regarded as a champion of etajtisjne or of 
centrally planned economies, had found free trade doctrines 
wanting when it came to ensuring the satisfaction of domestic 
conditions or international financial conditions for guaran-
teeing as high a level of employment as possible. His plan 
for the reconstruction of the postwar economic system provided 
for a high degree of intervention by the major states in a 
coordinated manner. As is well known, only a part of his plan 
was embodied in the establishment of the International Monetary 
Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment. Whatever may have been the dynamic factors undermining 
the foundations of the Bretton Woods system which Keynes helped 
set up, while it lasted, most economies of the world enjoyed a 
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much higher level of employment and a higher level of growth 
than they had ever done in their history. Economists and 
other analysts differ about the underlying causes of the 
breakdown of that system. Hans Singer (1989) has recently 
argued that the main reason for the main collapse of Bretton 
Woods system was that it was seriously incomplete in at least 
two respects. The first was that the International Trade 
Organization which would have allowed the world to pass to a 
freer trade regime with internationally coordinated policies 
supervised by the United Nations (rather than dictated at the 
convenience of a few advanced market economies) was never 
brought into existence. The other was that the obligation 
on the part of the countries which routinely ran up balance 
of payments surpluses to adjust their own economies was never 
enforced, so that all the burdens of adjustment to unbalanced 
international payments flows were borne by the chronically 
deficit countries. Unfortuantely, the poorer countries were 
the ones which generally ran up the balance of payments deficits, 
partly because many of them had rulers and rich men who sought 
to fatten their own purses at the cost of the public treasuries 
(see, for an analysis, Pastor, Jr. 1990). Thus instead of 
providing all the players with a level playing field, an 
incomplete Bretton Woods system placed bigger obstacles in the 
path of the weaker players. 
The breakdown of that system was followed by a rigorous 
analysis of the determinants of success or failure in interna-
tional trade ana domestic economic growth, and we have referred 
already to some of the major contributions in this area. This 
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analysis has added to the Keynesian armoury of policy instru-
ments a set of technological and organizational conditions 
which might help a country to pursue a policy of promoting 
the competitiveness of its products abroad and its growth 
of productivity at home. As Evans (1991, p.48) has put it, 
the case for infant industry protection can be made on 
grounds of 
economies of scale such that a competitive 
market cannot be achieved in product markets, 
a lack of perfect foresight in capital markets; 
external economies, such as, in labour training, 
affecting labour markets. 
Moreover, 
important producer goods such as knowledge and 
technology may have mixed public and private 
good attributes. 
To these grounds can be added the advantages conferred 
by market lock-in, learning by doing and pre-emptive entry and 
entry-deterring pricing and non-price policies. 
Of course, not each and every industry can or should be 
protected on such grounds. But the arguments for promotion, 
regulation or protection pertain not to the development of a 
particular industry but to the economy as a whole. Given an 
international economy dominated by a handful of countries, and 
a few hundred transnational corporations, the state may seek 
to create a social and economic environment which allows a less 
developed country to overcome the disadantages of starting with 
a less skilled labour force and poorer endowments of capital 
than others. Whether the state of a less developed economy can 
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sustain such an effort depends on the prevailing international 
payments system (e.g., of the kind that Keynes sought to create 
in the proposals formulated by him for Bretton Woods). If some 
less developed countries such as Taiwan and South Korea have 
been able to utilise the state apparatus to break out of a 
state of underdevelopment, it is at least partly because in the 
1950s and 1960s they enjoyed an exceptional international 
payments situation through the virtual underwriting of their 
external deficits by the United States and institutions aligned 
with the Western block and because they had privileged access 
to the markets of the U.S.A. and Western Europe. In Taiwan 
and South Korea the state was willing and able to intervene 
effectively whereas in most less developed countries, the state 
was hobbled by various political and social constraints. An 
analysis of those constraints and attempts to break them through 
appropriate social policies should surely be part of an exercise 
in political economy. Such exercises were carried out in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by political philosophers 
seeking to strengthen and purify absolute monarchies, philoso-
phers advocating republicanism and mercantilists and free 
traders seeking to liberate the economy from the trammels of 
corporates and feudal regulations. 
Unlike Adam Smith and his immediate predecessors of the 
Scottish Enlightenment, his contemporaries and his immediate 
successors, the 'new political economy* (NPE) has virtually 
nothing to say about the basic institutional and political 
conditions for speeding up the rate of accumulation in the 
economy. Yet, it is obvious that the champion growers of East 
Asia such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan Province of China, 
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Singapore, Hong Kong, the People's Republic of China, Indonesia 
and Thailand have also chalked up rates of investment exceeding 
those of most other countries : their rates of saving or invest-
ment (as percentages of GNP) exceeded 25 per cent throughout 
much of the 1970s and 1980s, and often exceeded 30 per cent in 
those years. In slow-growing countries, these rates rarely 
exceeded 20 per cent and often fell short of 10 per cent (the 
data are from ADB, 1991, Tables 2.1 - 2.23). 
The adoption of different degrees of openness in 
external trade relations, or different measures of governmental 
or social regulation of different sectors of the economy and 
the use of different kinds of policy instruments should be all 
dependent on the position of the particular economy in the 
matrices of international trade, investment, credit and labour 
flows, and few a_ joricri judgements about the exact fit of 
openness or stringent public regulation to the circumstances 
of a developing country can be advanced. It has been known 
at least since Austin Robinson's work on the different ways 
different firms resort to vertical or horizontal integration 
that technical economies of scale or even a larger endowment 
of initial financial power does not necessarily make a firm 
more dynamic. The takeover of Associated Electrical Industries 
by the General Electric Company is one of many such examples. 
In the Indian setting, to take an example at random, the Metalman 
Pipes which produces only one-third the value of output of 
Steel Tubes of India and has a correspondingly lower value of 
capital (both the firms own plants in Madhya Pradesh and 
produce with the help of foreign collaboration) has a much 
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better track record of profits. Yet Steel Tubes of India 
can survive and even expand (E T, 1991). If the argument of 
invincibility of economies of scale does not by itself ensure 
that only the currently advanced manufacturing countries can 
continue to grow, then, it is argued, the much greater capacity 
for R & D of the advanced economies will enforce their dominance 
in trade, in technology and in manufactures. The ability of 
East Asian economies to learn and beat the earlier masters 
in many fields requiring sophisticated technology can be cited 
as outstanding counter examples. But the R & D efforts in 
other developing countries than the East Asian tigers can also 
bear significant results. Cuba has done quite well in several 
fields of biotechnology. In India, the Astra Research Centre 
in Bangalore has been able to use recombinant DNA technologies 
to produce antidotes against asthma, shigella (a virulent type 
of diarrhoea), tuberculosis and neurocysticercosis, a neuro-
logical disease caused by tapeworms (Shetty, 1991). Such 
examples can be multiplied from many other poor countries. 
Empirically, it can be said that all the East Asian 
economies which have grown fast since the 1950s or 1960s satis-
fied the four basic social and political Conditions outlined 
above, viz. abolition of landlordism, spread of education to 
achieve universal literacy, assurance of a minimum supply of 
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provisions for every inhabitant, and government and a 
business class bent on raising the rate of accumulation within 
the country. It is also apparent that during the phase in 
which Japan, South Korea and Taiwan were on the trend-accelera-
tion trajectory, none of the governments followed the laiss_e_z 
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faire prescriptions of the proponents of the new political 
economy, such as Ian Little, Jagdish Bhagwati, Anne Krueger 
or Bela Balassa. None of them had an open-door policy towards 
direct foreign investment, all of them operated various instru-
ments for restricting imports, and most of them followed low-
interest policies for fostering domestic investment; and in 
most of them the government played an important part in 
directing investment into desired channels, often by using 
credit instruments and controls on allocation of scarce raw 
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materials or scarce foreign exchange. It has become part 
of the current orthodoxy of the IMF and the World Bank, that 
real rates of interest must fully reflect 'market conditions', 
and therefore, jacked up to 20 per cent and above. Setting 
aside for the moment the question as to whether it is possible 
to define 'market conditions' in an unambiguous manner in a 
market in which expectations, initial asset holdings, regula-
tory instruments and the degree of poverty play such an important 
part, the orthodoxy ignores the strong evidence that real rates of 
interest were low and often negative in the 1970s in some of 
the fast-growing countries (for the Korean case, see Woo, 1991). 
Free trade policies have been generally pursued by an 
economy which enjoys comparative advantage in most of the 
advancing sectors of manufacturing or services or which has 
established a financial hegemony in international capital 
markets, or both. Smaller economies which are in an essentially 
common market relationship with the dominant country and enjoy 
the benefit of influx of capital from the latter can also then 
practise a degree of openness in their external trade policies. 
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But a free trade policy does not necessarily follow, as the 
relationship of Britain to her whitesettled overseas colonies 
before the First World War demonstrates, Britain enjoyed dynamic 
comparative advantage in most branches of manufacturing up to the 
1860s, and dominated the international capital market throughout 
the long nineteenth century. The U.S.A. enjoyed both types of 
dominance from the 1940s up to the 1970s, and her financial and 
economic dominance was completed by military dominance. In the 
1930s while she lost her dominant position in many branches of 
manufacturing, her dominance in services, banking and military 
preparedness were not yet seriously challenged. The U .S.A. also 
enjoys a special position as the ultimate haven of the rich every-
where. The latter characteristic is unlikely to be duplicated 
except in an European community which can give up the attitude of 
'fortress Europe' and shed some of the most serious pieces of 
protectionism. 
Most poor countries have not adopted 'external liberali-
zation' voluntarily. It has been forced on them because of their 
entrapment in a network of foreign aid and loans, an entrapment in 
which some sections of their ruling class have deliberately colluded, 
Liberalization has often been adopted as a substitute for basic 
institutional changes that could promote growth and development 
and naturally has led to impoverishment and stagnation in most 
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cases. External liberalization is accompanied by all the wrong 
signals for accelerating investment and growth : devaluation is 
generally accompanied by an immediate acceleration in the rate of 
inflation and the pressure to cut down domestic absorption leads 
to domestic recession; a rise in rates of interest and a state of 
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credit stringency adds to recessionary tendencies, and antici-
pation of devaluation leads to further capital flight. Capital 
flight has been one important reason for the enmeshing of many 
Latin American countries in the debt trap. Despite claims to 
the contrary, little evidence has been found that capital flight 
is greatly sensitive to changes in rates of interest as such. 
Moreover, it also turns out that the removal of controls over 
capital movements mandated by IMF programmes of adjustment 
tends to accelerate rather than arrest capital flight (Pastor, 
Jr., 1990). Many studies also show that so long as the massive 
debt overhang persists there is little prospect of private 
investment responding positively to various liberalization and 
stabilization measures. A recent paper published by two IMF 
staff members, concludes that 'developing countries with high 
growth rates, and income levels, low inflation and debt, and 
substantial public investment have higher levels of private 
investment relative to GDP' (Greene and Villanueva, 1991). So 
some of the key results or recommendations of IMF-style libera-, 
lization such as increasing the rate of inflation as a natural 
consequence of hig] er interest rates, drastic devaluation and 
removal of subsidies and de-scaling of public investment (and. 
public expenditure in general) are precisely likely to dampen 
the prospects of prosperity of the countries that the IMF and 
new political economy doctors want to treat with their medicine. 
Looking at the historical record of today's developed 
or industrialized countries, a broad generalization can be 
hazarded : all of them had restricted trade regimes in place 
during the period when they were experiencing trend acceleration 
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in economic growth and when their occupational and earnings 
structure were changing to increase the importance of the 
secondary and tertiary sectors, and marginalize the primary 
sector. Even while they were practising such restricted 
trade regimes, they were advocating free trade policies for 
others, and on occasion.were able to cajole and force other tr ao e 
countries to adopt free/policies. Even while British publicists 
and policy-makers were persuading the newly liberated Latin 
American countries to do away with all trade restrictions, 
Britain herself was still practising a wide array of trade 
restrictions not only against other European countries but 
also against her direct colonies such as India. Similarly, 
even while the U.S. and European policy-makers were more or 
less forcing the less developed countries to introduce external 
trade liberalization, the protectionist barriers were going up 
in the shape of multifibre agreements, voluntary export restraint 
agreements, and straight subsidies to agriculture, steel and 
many other industries under threat from foreign competition. 
The new political economy (NPE) not only ignores this 
dominance-subordination relationship in contemporary developments. 
It has also either ignored history or misread it in order to 
suit its purposes. The revolutionary restructuring of European 
policies and societies before the onset of industrialization 
is simply taken for granted by them and they seem to regard 
institutional and social changes to be a passive consequence 
of commercialization rather than as a necessary precondition 
for the building of a society ruled by free contracts aid free 
choice. There is no reference in their writings to the kind 
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of debates in social philosophy that led to the emergence of 
political economy as a separate discipline. Where there is 
an attempt to invoke history, it often consists of arbitrary 
juxtaposition of some evidence of malfunctioning of markets 
in less developed countries with evidence of better function-
ing markets in advanced industrialized societies. The malfunc-
tioning of markets is generally attributed, by using the logic 
o f E°sJi bPS fLE2° j^ rojoer hoc, to government intervention, 
ignoring most other sources of malfunctioning such as the 
prevalence of non-market power, private monopoly or acute 
insecurity on the part of people continually on the verge of 
starvation. Moreover, the extensive evidence of malfunctioning 
of markets in early phase of industrialization in many of today's 
industrialized societies is also ignored by the proponents of 
15 the 1 new political economy. 
Little, Scitovsky and Scott (1970) for example, 
asserted that the gap between urban and rural wages was high 
in developing countries. Then they explained the puzzle by 
attributing the 'high and increasing wages' of urban labour 
to the strength of trade unions and to protectionist policies 
which boosted profits and hence increased the pressure for 
increasing wages. They did not pause to enquire as to whether 
average urban wages had increased, say, in India faster than 
the cost of living. In fact, between 1939 and 1970, with some 
cyclical fluctuations, real wages of factory workers remained 
virtually stagnant in India, and trade unions were just about 
able to secure restoration of the very low prewar standards of 
real wages after their disastrous fall during the second World 
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War, Little, Scitovsky and Scott attributed the urban-rural 
wage gap to protectionism. Again, if they had enquired into 
the phenomenon seriously, they would have found that the wage 
gap long preceded the restricted trade regime in India and it 
pertained only to the wages of the socalled organized sector 
as against those of the socalled unorganized or informal 
sector. 
There was also an implicit assumption in Little, 
Scitovsky and Scott (1970) that rural-urban wage gaps were a 
peculiarity of underdeveloped countries. When they appear in 
an extreme form, they are the direct or indirect reflection 
of racial discrimination, discrimination along lines of communi-
ties and castes, or other status groups, sluggish economic 
growth and obstacles agairsst mobility of labour. But they 
are not the direct result of a restricted trade regime, nor 
are rural-urban wage gaps or regional wage gaps the peculiarity 
of underdeveloped countries, as the case of Britain in the 
century from 1760 to 1860 would amply illustrate. 
In individual instances practitioners of NPE displayed 
some awareness of the historical dimensions of the problem of 
malfunctioning markets and slow growth in the less developed 
countries. Thus, for example, Bhagwati Desai (1970, chapters 
2 and 3) were aware both of the constraints that British rule 
imposed on the development of indigenous entrepreneurship in 
India and of the limitations of the indigenous mercantile class 
inherited by independent India. But when it come to analysing 
the roots of monopolistic and 'rent-seeking' behaviour, they 
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sought them almost entirely in the package of government 
policies inherited or instituted by government of post-inde-
pendence India to the exclusion of the survival of landlordism 
over most parts of rural India, the deeply rooted tendency of 
merchants to rig prices or corner stocks and the infraction of 
normal free market behaviour because of the existence of a vast 
mass of peoole continually on the verge of unemployment and 
starvation. 
Some other students of NPE have gone further and 
denied any untoward effects on prospects of industrialization 
caused by the spread and persistence of formal and informal 
colonialism over most parts of the globe, beginning from the 
sixteenth century and lasting well beyond the middle of the 
twentieth century. The abundant evidence of the relative and 
even absolute retrogression of most parts of the world outside 
the North Atlantic and East Asian economies (Bairoch, 1982) 
has been entirely ignored by them. Seme of the practitioners 
of NPE, such as IND Little (1982) have argued that India, the 
most populous country ever to have been a formal colony of a 
European power, lost nothing in terms of industrialization 
by the commercial dominance of Britain or by British rule and 
in fact gained substantially through the growth of modern 
industry. Little's evidence is entirely culled from secondary 
sources. His story starts in the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, and ignores near prohibition of most varieties of 
Indian cotton textiles in Britain during the whole of the 
eighteenth century (Thomas, 1926). For the nineteenth century 
he makes very selective use of his evidence, pointedly ignoring 
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the evidence of discrimination against domestically produced 
Indian textiles in favour of British textiles." 
As in colonial India, so in other parts of the world, 
'free trade' has been a policy often practised under external 
constraints of formal and informal domination by another country 
or another group of countries, and within an institutional 
setting that impeded the mobility of factors of production and 
the working of freely competitive markets. There is evidence, 
for example, that India paid higher prices for many commodities 
that were produced by British firms but were available from 
other sources, and received lower prices for some of her most 
important exports when the destination was the U.K. rather than 
countries outside the British Empire (Banerjee, 1990; Bagchi, 
1972, chapters 6 and 8). Evidence has also accumulated that 
the Indian cotton textile industry became less competitive 
compared with that of Japan by the beginning of the twentieth 
century, mainly because of the blinkered faith of Indian 
industrialists and their British advisers in the superiority 
of Lancashire technology and mill management (Bagchi, 1938). 
Political economy and its antecedent discoursess from 
the sixteenth to the early nineteenth century were discourses 
of power and plenty : they were discourses of power of the 
state over the activities of the citizens, of capital over 
labour, of domestic manufacturing and trade over foreign manu-
facturers and traders. But they also produced analyses of 
whcle societies arc! states, and were not abstractions delinked 
from the situations of particular states and societies. After 
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Ricardo and the vulgar Ricardians such as J.R. McCulloch and 
Harriet Martineau, la_isse_z f aire became entirely a discourse 
of dominance of the rich countries over the poor : the new 
'nationalist' or historicist schools based in the U.S.A. and 
Germany produced defensive discourses but aimed at eventual 
dominance. The neoclassical political economy is also basi-
cally a discourse of dominance of rich over poor nations, of 
financial over manufacturing capital, of internationalized 
domestic capital over more narrowly domestically based capital 
and of course, of aggressive capital over weak or non-existent 
trade unions. It is not the logical profundity or the empirical 
soundness that gives NPE its cutting edge. It is its alliance 
with the power of the dominant nations, with internationalized 
domestic capital and with transnational capital that makes it 
powerful. The new theories of international trade, and technical 
progress through localized learning, adaptive learning and 
idiosyncratic evolution can produce a discourse that can show 
up the hollowness of the universalism claimed by the proponents 
of the new political economy. But the production of such a 
discourse has to battle with the detritus and debris, the casual 
empiricism and the shoddy history churned out by the knights of 
free trade and liberalization. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Adam Smith was much more aware of the importance of 
considerations of justice, prevailing public opinion, 
and designing of appropriate institutions in making 
political economy serve as the 'science of the legislator' 
than most historians of economic thought have credited 
him with. His Theory of Moral Sentiments was published 
originally in 1759,' reprinfecT several''times in his lifetime 
and extensively revised by him in 1790 (Smith, 1759) long 
after the publication of the first edition of his Wealjth 
of Nations. Hence we can assume that he took the princi-
ples oT"morality and justice adumbrated there to underlie 
the practical policy proposals made in the Wealthy of 
Nations. The theoretical disembedding of the principles 
of 'free trade, in other words, assumed the functioning 
of a definite institutional framework. For an elaboration 
of Smith's position in this respect see Winch, 1983; for 
a brief account of the philosophical unaerspinnings and 
background of the WeaKh^of Nations, see Taylor, (1960), 
chapters 2-4. 
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2. On the experience of Sir James Steuart as a Scotsman 
with predominantly continental European connections 
and its influence on his work, see the editor's intro-
duction to Steuart, 1966, vol.1. 
3. for a masterly resume of the theoretical developments 
until the 1930s, see Viner (1937), chapters VI and VII. 
4. My analysis in this paragraph and the next is entirely 
based on Semrnel, (1970) , chapter 2. 
5. The view implicitly advanced here, viz., that after Adam 
Smith, political economy was set adrift from its moorings 
in a general theory of society and institutional change 
and made into a system which was peculiarly suited to the 
needs of advanced capitalist economies, has been challenged. 
But this view has been defended again by Winch, (1983), 
See also in this connection, Evans, (1988), chapter 3. 
6. The literature on Japan, South Korea and the Taiwan 
Province of China is vast and growing as fast as their 
economies. Some major references are given in Bagchi 
(1987a and 1987b), Amsden, (1989) and Woo (1991). 
7. For summary and a critique of the 'new political economy1 
as applied to problems of development, see Toye (1987). 
I had critically reviewed Bhagwati and Desai (1970), and 
Little, Scitovsky and Scott (1970), in Bagchi (1971). 
8. For surveys of the new theory of international trade, 
upto about .1934, see Jones and Kenen (1984, 1985); see 
also Helpman and Krugman (1985, 1989); Krugman (1987a), 
Dixit (1987), and Krugman (1989). For a survey of the 
literature on product differentiation and its relationship 
to Kaldor's pioneering work on the relationship between 
firms with similar but differentiated products and loca-
tions, see Eaton and Lipsey (1978, 1979 and 1989). For 
other approaches to strategic trade policy, see Brander 
and Spencer (1981, 1983 and 1985). The relation of^ 
increasing returns and technical progress to the rate 
and pattern of economic growth is treated by Romer (1986), 
Lucas (1988), Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) and 
Krugman (1991). 
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9. For references to the work of Gunnar Myrdal, Paul Baran, 
Andre Gunder Frank and Samir Amin, and the dependency 
and schools, see Bernstein (1973), Brewer (1980), Bagchi 
(1982), Patnaik (1986), Palma (1987) and Evans (1988). 
10. See Elbaum (1990). Elbaum's argument can be nested in 
the theoretical propositions advanced by Atkinson and 
Stiglitz (1969) and Arthur (1989). While Elbaum is 
sensitive to the social and political setting of British 
industry in the nineteenth century, he still tends to 
underestimate the significance of the markets provided 
by Britain's dependent, non-white colonies, and the 
massive migration of capital and labour from Britain to 
the New World. Britain could continue to sell the products 
of its cotton mills abroad because her biggest customer 
by then was India, a dependent colony in which the finan-
cial and marketing networks were dominated by British 
businessmen. There is also some evidence that Britain 
bought its cotton at a lower price from India than its 
major non-Indian competitor, viz., Japan did. The monopoly 
of cotton textile machinery sales to India enjoyed by the 
British manufacturers was another knot tying the Indian 
market to British mill interests. Elbaum has noted that 
Lancashire mills enjoyed an elastic supply of skilled 
labourers even though the wages of the latter were not 
rising fast. This was connected with the fact that 
greater numbers of unskilled labourers and agricultural 
labourers migrated from the United Kingdom than other 
sections of the population, at least during the peak 
migration decades of 1876-1901. Out of a total number of 
2,032,450 migrants with stated occupations, 1,044,225, or 
more than 50 per cent were domestic servants, (general) 
labourers and agricultural labourers (Thomas, 1973, Table 
11). Thus Britain was left with a larger endowment of 
workers with traditional industrial skills in 1900, than 
she had, proportionately speaking, in 1876, and this 
provided an added impulse to her path-dependent trajectory. 
11. For a concise account of the post-Second World War record 
of the State intervention in critical areas of the French 
economy, see Hayward (1986) and Mytelka (1982). 
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12. For assessments of the relative roles of public action 
and economic growth in different countries in sustaining 
a basic minimum acceptable standard of livinq. see Drezp 
and Sen (1939). 
13. For a summary of various regulatorv policies followed in 
the Republic of Korea up to about 1935, see Bagchi (1987a) 
chapter 3; see also IBRD (1987). For a recent account 
which assigns a preeminent role to government policies of 
allocation of domestic credit and foreign loans in South 
Korea's emergence as an industrialized economy, see Woo 
(1991). 
14. For evidence that 'liberalization' and 'stabilization' 
have not promoted growth in most of the poor countries, 
see Dornbusch (1990). 
15. In one of the earliest salvoes of the new political 
economy, viz., Little, Scitovsky and Scott (1970, chapter 
3), it is asserted, for example, that urban population 
were increasing much too fast in the seven developing 
countries picked by the authors for special analysis. 
However, in India, the most populous of the countries 
chosen by them, rates of growth of urban population 
3.5 per cent per annum) and the degree of urbanization 
around 20 per cent in 1970), were low by the standards 
of, say, western Europe in the nineteenth century. More-
over, China, a developing country and the most populous 
country in the world the speed of urbanization was low 
by international standards. In fact, barring the cases 
of a few Latin American countries, urbanization rates in 
today's less developed countries are probably no higher 
than in the advanced market economies at a comparative 
stage of development (Preston, 1968). This does not mean 
that rates of urbanization are not too high in relation 
to the resource of these countries. But that has to be 
established with a close analysis of the social structures, 
including, for example, agrarian relations. That task 
is not on the agenda of NPE. 
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16. Little (1982) claims that India's 'export trade in handi-
crafts was killed by the Industrial Revolution, not by the 
British Raj' 'p.357). He then admits that colonialism had 
something to uo with the constriction of the domestic market 
for Indian cottons, and attributes it to the very low level 
of tariff on imports into India. He quotes Dutt (1906) but 
not the evidence cited there from various Parliamentary 
enquiries and enquiries by British officials in India about 
the prohibitive nature of duties imposed on Indian cotton 
and silk and the 'reverse protection' suffered by Indian 
handloom products within India herself (Dutt, 1906, pp. 179-
182), Dealing with the differential treatment of Indian 
and imported British cotton manufactures in India, Lord 
Ellenborough pointed out in 1335 that while the British 
goods imported into India paid a duty of 2.5 per cent, the 
cotton manufactures of India in their home country paid a 
duty of 17 ,.5 per cent (Dutt, 1906, pt212). Little misses 
out all this," and citing the authority of Hametty (1972) 
states that 'during 1814-49 the Indian tariff on cotton 
piece goods was 5 per cent and 3e5 per cent on yarns 
(Little, 1982; p.357). 
Little goes on to assert : ;The hardest time for the hand-
loom weavers was probably the 1820s, the scanty evidence 
suggesting that there was no decline in output in any other 
period and that the weavers' relative position 'seems not 
to have changed in 100 yaars' before the first World War' 
(Little, 19825 pp 357-8) 0 I had used the evidence of 
Francis Buchanan Hamilton to show that the view shared by 
British officials such as Charles Trevelyan, H.H. Wilson 
and nationalists such as Dadabhai Naoroji, R.C. Dutt and 
M.G. Ranade that British policies led to a massive decline 
of Indian handicrafts and the caj cing of vast members of 
people on to a relatively stagnant agricultural sector had 
a solid foundation. More recent work, by J. Krishnamurty 
(1985), S. Krishnamurty (±987) and R. Chatterjee (1987) 
for Bengal and western India has strengthened that conclu-
sion by tracing the relative decline of handicrafts (in 
terms of the proportion of population supported by them) 
and the sagging of real wages of agricultural labourers 
down to the end of the nineteenth century. Some recent 
work of Amalendu Guha (1989) shows that for India as a 
whole handloom output fell in several decades in the 
nineteenth century. 
Official evidence of immiserization of weavers, small 
peasants and agricultural- labourers piled up also in the 
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various Indian Famine Commission Reports and their 
minutes of evidence, the Gazetteers of the Bombay 
Presidency, and in the reports prepared by many other 
British administrators and scientists. But Little, 
of course, would not 'believe* that these were credible 
results of the era of free trade beloved of him ('I 
believe' and 'I do not believe' seem to be a recurrent 
refrain in his style of argument). 
The experience of India in suffering absolute or 
relative de-industrialization was not unique. Many 
parts of the Ottoman empire in Africa and Asia, and 
indeed many regions of central and southern Europe went 
through a similar experience in the nineteenth century, 
but public action often cushioned the impact of such 
developments in Europe (Sabel and Zeitlin, 1985). 
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